




FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION  
WITH STUDENT LOANS 








There are many economic and philosophical arguments supporting the introduction of student loans as a 
way to complement public financing and secure adequate resources for higher education, particularly in 
Europe. These arguments are briefly reviewed in this paper. But the case in favour of student loans largely 
rests on the capability to provide loans that are income-contingent. Indeed, income-contingent repayments 
are critical to both efficiency (students and lenders should not be deterred due to excessive risk) and equity 
(contributions should be tailored to ex post ability to pay). But income-contingency comes at a cost that 
can  be  expressed  as  a  risk  premium  that  should  be  supported  and  shared  between  graduates  and/or 
taxpayers. The central aim of this paper is to produce realistic estimates of such a risk, identifying the 
conditions for the implementation of an income-contingent loan scheme in order to channel additional 
private funding to higher education systems. How does low lifetime income and/or unemployment spells 
among  higher  education  graduates  translates  into  risk  premia?  Results,  derived  from  the  analysis  of 
Belgian  earnings  data,  suggest  that  the  risk  premium  ranges  from  13%  for  university  (ISCED  6-7) 
graduates to 26% for non-university (ISCED 5) ones. The paper further investigates the various ways of 
pooling and shifting this risk, while addressing the danger of public debt classification (ie, student loans 
classified as public) and adverse selection (ie, unsustainable pooling of high and low risk loans). 
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Introduction 
 
Accumulation of human capital is crucial to economic prosperity. Although this idea is fairly old it is 
currently  gaining a lot more of attention among economists and decision-makers. Mass (and quality) 
higher education seems justified for several reasons in order to favour economic growth. One of them 
being the current speed of technological change that makes high-skilled individuals more important than 
ever as a determinant of economic performance (Kremer, 1993). 
 
In  most  European  countries,  public  financing  has  been  considered  as  the  traditional  approach  for 
supporting tertiary education.  Even if tuition fees have been introduced in various countries, they only 
contribute for a small amount to the funding needs of higher education institutions.  The average subsidy 
rate for higher education
1 in European countries ranges from 76% to 99%.  In most European countries, 
the subsidy rate is above 90%. But beyond the need to deal with increased budgetary pressure affecting 
the long term sustainability of higher education system, the transfer of the financial burden to students 
could be justified for several other factors: the magnitude of the private rate of returns to higher education 
measured in terms of earning premium and lower risk of unemployment, as well as the positive impact on 
the quality of life.  The increase in the private contribution to the cost of higher education could take the 
form of an income-contingent student loan mechanism based on a deferred repayment scheme mimicking 
the future flow of earnings . 
 
The idea of increasing private contribution via student loans and not upfront higher fess is directly related 
to the existence of liquidity constraints for students, especially for students from lower socio-economic 
background not able to finance education themselves.  
 
                                                 
1 Defined as the share of direct public expenditure in educational institutions and total public subsidies to households 
and other private entities in total sources of funds for higher education 3 
But  the  analysis  needs  to  go  a  step  further  and  consider  the  conditions  under  which  student  loans 
mechanisms are likely to be efficient. Human capital investment is indeed more risky than other forms of 
investments; a key reason for this being the absence of collateral. The risky nature of human capital 
investment might affect the behaviour of risk-averse students (the borrowers) as well as that of capital 
markets (the lenders) and lead to underinvestment by individuals or credit rationing on the market for 
student loans. Both situations are synonymous with inefficiency. Consequently, incorporating insurance 
mechanisms seems to be crucial to address efficiency concerns. And income-contingency (ie, insurance 
against the absence of the loss or earnings) is an obvious candidate.  
 
Income-contingency  is  also  a  way  to  ensure  that  private  contribution  is  equitable,  in  particular  that 
payments are somehow indexed on graduates' ability to pay. A student's current ability to pay is, by 
definition, unknown as it primarily depends on future earnings. Consequently, the only way to enforce the 
ability to pay principle at the level of the individual
2 is to deferred its implementation at a time when the 
resulting income of the student will be verifiable. This is precisely what an income-contingent repayment 
is about.  
 
There  are  several  ways  of  implementing  payments  that  are  simultaneously  deferred  and  income-
contingent. This paper will focus on loans with income forgiveness (LIF) (Palacios, 2004). The latter is 
essentially a mortgage-type loan, where students explicitly borrow a certain amount of money at time of 
study and pay monthly or yearly instalments after graduation, up to a predetermined horizon (ie, the 
duration  of  the  loan).  Income-contingency  comes  from  the  fact  that  payment  is  conditional  on  the 
individuals making more than a certain amount of money.  
 
But income-contingency operates like an insurance mechanism, and it comes at a cost. The latter can be 
expressed as a risk premium that should be supported and shared between the graduates and/or taxpayers. 
A central aim of this paper is to produce realistic estimates of such a risk and its cost. How does low 
                                                 
 4 
lifetime  income  and/or  unemployment  spells  among  higher  education  graduates  translates  into  a risk 
premium? Results, derived from the analysis of 1999 Belgian earnings data, suggest that the risk premium 
ranges from 13% for university (ISCED
3 6-7) graduates to 26% for non-university (ISCED 5) ones.  
 
Section 2 examines both contextual and theoretical arguments supporting an increased private contribution 
to higher education costs via deferred payments taking the form of income-contingent loans. Section 3 
exploits Belgian panel data to simulate the key characteristics of income-contingent loans, in particular the 
risk-premium generated by income-contingency. Section 4 further discusses the different ways of shifting 
and pooling this risk-premium while addressing the danger of public debt classification (ie, student loans 
classified as public debt when the risk premium if totally paid by the Government) and adverse selection 
(ie, inadequate pooling of high and low risk loans). Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The  case  for  higher  private  contribution  via  income-contingent  student 
loans 
2.1. Why should individuals pay more? 
 
The potential pressure for reforming the existing funding of higher education across the EU is partially 
related to increased budgetary pressure, in a context where higher education is becoming a mass industry 
reflecting the willingness to increase the average stock of human capital to cope with the demand for a 
skilled workforce and where governments must cope with booming pension and health costs, but also to 
increased social demand for higher education coming from individual decision and from public policy 
orientation
4.   
 
The amount of public funding for tertiary education affordable by EU countries has also to integrate the 
increased mobility trends of students.  As EU students are entitled to the same treatment in terms of access 
                                                 
3International Standard Classification of Education. See http://www.irdes.fr/ecosante/OCDE/941.html for details 
4As exemplified by the objectives defined by the European Union in the framework of the Lisbon process. 5 
to tertiary education as nationals, countries which are net hosts of EU or foreign students subsidize the net 
sending  countries.    This  generates  a  free-riding  problems  with  unequal  costs  of  the  various  tertiary 
education system not compensated by the social benefits of tertiary education for the host country when 
most  students  are  expected  to  return  to  their  home  counties,  with  the  resulting  potential  risk  of 
underinvestment by some governments. The push towards free circulation of people associated with a 
modification in the openness of labour market and the recent convergence process between European 
higher education systems initiated by the Bologna process could favour mobility of students and graduates 
and hence affect the sustainability of the public financing of higher education.  Indeed, the contribution of 
graduates through the tax system to the funding of higher education (expressed as a repayment of the 
implicit loan they benefited from during their studies) depends on the graduates’ decision to live in the 
fiscal territory from which the public funding to higher education institutions is coming from (based on 
the notion of the principle of ‘origin’).  The potential mobility of students and graduates, not only inducing 
a form of ‘brain or skill drain’ and loss of human capital for the educational host country having borne all 
the cost associated to the financing of compulsory education, will put additional pressure on the nature of 
the funding flows within the tertiary education sector.  This effect could be partially compensated if the 
exit of graduates is mitigated by the entry of graduates coming from foreign countries.  But it would only 
indirectly contribute to generating revenues. 
 
At the OECD level, student mobility increased over the last years.  An important disparity exists among 
European countries where the UK has the highest net intake in proportion of tertiary enrolment while 
Ireland shows the highest net outflow of students
5.  In terms of mobility of graduates, there is a lack of 
evidences allowing to properly assess the magnitude of migration of high-skilled workers.  A recent study
6 
based  on  surveys of  graduates  in  Europe  identified  a  correlation  between  students’  mobility and  the 
likelihood for a student to work abroad after graduation.  However, the study reported that ‘the majority of 
                                                 
5Although no OECD data are available for Greece for the net intake of foreign students relative to total tertiary enrolment, this 
country has also a very high number of students going abroad relative to total tertiary enrolment estimated to 13.1%.  Excluding 
Luxembourg which is not offering complete higher education curriculum, Greece is the European countries in 2000 with the large 
proportion of students enrolled outside the country. 
6Career After Higher education: a European Research Study (CHEERS), TSER Research project “Higher Education and Graduate 
Employment in Europe”- http://www.uni-kassel.de/wz1/tseregs.htm. 6 
formerly mobile students are employed at home’ (Teichler and Jahr, 2001), not corroborating factual 
evidences about a brain drain of graduates (e.g. in the Greek situation, Pascharopoulos (2002) reported 
that Greek students obtaining their degree from well-known Anglo-Saxon universities are not returning to 
Greece for working). 
 
But there are more theoretical reasons for increasing individual participation to costs. One of them is the 
'benefit' principle: the person who benefits should pay. There is indeed plenty of empirical research to 
suggest that the private benefits (higher wages, lower risk of unemployment...) from education are large 
(Karasiotou, 2004),  and  probably  on  the rise due to  a  rising  demand for skills  cause  by  skill-biased 
technological progress (Kremer, 1993).  Additional private benefits are derived from better health and 
personal satisfaction for individuals gaining qualifications through higher education. As a consequence, 
higher education could not be considered as a pure public good.  Since higher education generates social 
benefits (e.g. the positive impact on the rate of technological innovation), taxpayers still have to contribute 
to the financing of higher education, but an appropriate mix between private contribution and public 
funding has to be found.  Indeed, public subsidies (ie, taxpayers contribution) to finance higher education 
could imply a reverse distribution since the incidence of the costs is borne by the average taxpayers 
whereas the benefits accrue to the most talented or wealthy individuals
7 The pooling of costs and benefits 
in the case of free education is not reflecting the individual variation in the sharing of the costs and 
benefits resulting from tertiary education.  
 
2.2. Why deferred payment? 
 
The simplest way to increase private contribution is to increase fees that students (or their families) are 
asked to pay upfront. But the consensus among economists is that higher upfront fees would be both 
inefficient and inequitable. Consequently they generally favour a system where higher education is free at 
                                                 
7 Noting that recent studies for Germany (Barbaro, 2003) do not find evidence for a regressive impact of public 
subsidies.   7 
the  point  of  use (Barr,  2001).    The  argument  essentially  rests  on the idea  of  (unequally  distributed) 
liquidity constraints.  Attending higher education represents an investment generating benefits in the form 
of higher earnings potential later in life, materializing some time after the costs of being educated are 
incurred.  The latter can be high as they include i) fees ii) cost of living and – most importantly – 
opportunity costs ie, forgone earnings if full-time attendance if required. The presence of a liquidity 
constraints for students due to the lack of sufficient income or capital market failures when deciding on 
participation to higher education has three major effects: (i) a loss of talent since high ability low income 
students will be deter to apply for higher education generating an efficiency and a social loss; (ii) a loss of 
opportunity to individuals and (iii) a strengthening of the link between family background and a person’s 
lifetime income.  
 
The obvious response to liquidity constraints – in a context where individuals, not governments, should 
pay more – is to offer (or impose) deferred payment options. Various possibilities are usually considered 
to  address  the  existing  funding  issues  of  tertiary  education  system  (Barr,  2001,  2002; Greenaway  & 
Haynes, 2003 ; Jacobs, 2002): introduction of graduate tax or recourse to student contracts.  Although the 
graduate  tax  (Oosterbeek,  1998;  Johnes,  1993,  &  Barr,  2001)  is  perceived  as  favouring  equity  by 
equalizing the starting positions of students from low and high income families, such a system does not 
appear as the appropriate solution to the current funding problem of higher education systems in Europe.  
The advantages of a graduate tax are: (i) contingent upon the earnings of graduate; (ii) low demanding in 
terms of administration costs; (ii) generating important amount of additional funding in the long term.  
However, in a structure with an open-ended graduate tax, such a system appears to be unfair, since people 
with high lifetime earnings repay considerably more than they have effectively borrowed for completing 
their degree, not reflecting the differences in costs between degrees and the variability in the earnings 
profile.  In addition, such a system mixes educational and income policy.  It does not differentiate total 
earnings from the incremental amount coming from higher education, with the additional consequence 
that the final allocation of public funds depends on the political process.  The existence of graduate tax 
will  not  per  se  increase the  priority  level  of  tertiary  education  with respect to  other  public  policies.  8 
Finally, the mobility of students after graduation could be the source of important leakage without proper 
European harmonization of income tax collecting systems. 
 
Considering now the case of student contracts, a distinction should be introduced between debt contract  
(ie,  the student loans we are interested in here) and equity contract.  By definition, a debt contract is a 
promise to pay back a fixed amount (an instalment), as a stream of interest payment + principal payback.  
In the case of equity contract, the contractual arrangement corresponds to the engagement to pay a share 
of the profits generated either as a dividend or/and a rise in the value of the shares.  Transposed to student 
funding, it corresponds to the notion of ‘human capital contract’, ‘in which students commit part of their 
future  income  for  a  predetermined  period  of  time  in  exchange  for  capital  for  financing  education’ 
(Palacios, 2004).  The equity contract shares the same drawback than the graduate income tax:, ie, not to 
be commensurate with the additional earnings related to the achievement of higher education studies
8.  
Indeed,  to  achieve  a  sufficient  mutualisation  of  risks,  investors  should  build  a  balanced  portfolio  of 
students through which they would get back more than their initial investment from relatively successful 
graduates compensating for the failure to recoup their original investment from unsuccessful ones.  As a 
consequence, the stream of payment from the graduates is not directly proportional to the human capital 
earnings premium. 
 
2.3. Why income-contingent payments? 
 
The  difficulty  with  debt  contracts  (ie,  student  loans)  is  that  they  are  poised  with  information  and 
uncertainty  problems  that  need  to  be  properly  addressed.  Students  face  higher  risks  in  borrowing  to 
finance human capital than – for example – an average individual borrowing to buy a house due to the 
lack of collateral. As stated by Barr (2001), a person who buys a house knows what she is buying, the 
house is unlikely to fall down, the real value of the house will generally increase and – most importantly -- 
                                                 
8A good way to figure out the nature of this problem is to consider the amount of money Mick Jaeger would have 
paid over his career compared to his cohort fellows if private contribution to human capital costs was based on 
graduate tax or an equity contract.  9 
if  earnings  fall,  making  repayments  burdensome,  she  can  sell  the  house.  In  other  words,  the  house 
generally act as collateral for the loan, meaning that loans can be obtained on good terms from the bank. 
 
By contrast, future students – particularly those from low socio-economic background, whose parents did 
not attend higher education – are not necessary fully aware of the magnitude of the return on human 
capital  investment.  Even  well-informed  students  face  risk:  though  average  private  rate  of  return  to 
investment is fairly high, there is considerable variance about that average. In addition, in labour market 
that tend to be more flexible and household configurations that are much less stable (divorces, separations, 
relocations...) than a few decades ago, graduates might face large fluctuation in their short-term levels of 
earnings. Finally, someone who has borrowed to pay for a qualification and faces lower earnings does not 
have the option to sell his degree, further increasing the exposure to risk and the propensity of private 
banks to deny access to credit or charge high risk premia. 
 
From the demand-side it is thus important to have a mechanism offering the borrower insurance against 
potential future poverty, which is of great relevance to reduce the applicant’s risk aversion, but at the same 
time providing the adequate discipline to ensure the repayment of the loan.  Repayment is spread over the 
professional  career  of  the  student,  improving  the  matching  between  repayment  of  the  loan  and  the 
materialisation of the benefits of the investment, as an earning premium.   
 
Finally,  the  case  for  income-contingency  also  rests  on  more  philosophical  grounds.  Reference  is 
frequently made to ability to pay in discussion about higher education finance. Private contribution to 
education costs should be function of the ability to pay of student. The difficulty with this principle is that 
students' ability to pay is not known, as it primarily depends on their future earnings. 
1Ability to pay, in 
most  discussions  about  higher  education  finance,  de  facto  refers  to  the  wealth  of  student's  relatives 
(parents,...); not the student himself. Consequently, the only way to properly and adequately enforce the 
ability to pay principle (in combination with the benefit principle) is to deferred its implementation at a 
time when the resulting income of the student will be verifiable. This is precisely what income-contingent 10 
loans repayment is about. Graduates with lower lifetime earnings pay less (or do not pay at all) while 
those with higher earnings pay in full (principal + interest), but in proportion commensurate to the initial 
cost of their investment in higher education. 
 
2.4. How to parameter income-contingency? 
 
The idea of income-contingency is central to our argument. But it still needs to be flesh out in order to be 
implemented.  When  should  graduates  be  exonerated  from  payment  and  benefit  from  the  insurance 
mechanism ? We think that human capital theory, combined to the 'benefit' principle, provides adequate 
guidelines to this problem.  
 
Private contribution should somehow be proportional to the benefits derived from the kind of human 
capital acquired at tertiary level (ie, higher education); not the one acquired at primary or secondary 
school. And a simple way to translate this idea is to decide that higher education graduates should pay 
their loan instalment only if their annual net wage is above the average wage of less educated ones, 
typically  individual  with  no  higher  education  attainment.  This  configuration  is  often  reported  in  the 
literature as students loans with income-forgiveness (LIF) (Palacios, 2004). . 
 
3. The cost of income-contingency 
 
The conclusion of section 2 is that in order to secure additional funding resources for higher education 
systems, students loans are highly desirable. But the case in favour of student loans largely rests on the 
capability to provide loans that are income-contingent. Indeed, the latter is critical to both efficiency 
(students and lenders should not be deterred due to excessive risk) and equity (contributions should be 
tailored to ex post ability to pay). But income-contingency comes at a cost that should be supported and 
shared  between  the  graduates  and/or  taxpayers.    But  before  discussing  this  risk  pooling  or  shifting 
question  (section  4)  we  believe  is  worth  quantifying  the  cost  of income-contingency.  How  does low 11 
lifetime  income  and  unemployment  spells  among  tertiary  education  graduates  –  situations  in  which 
graduates would be relieved from their payment obligation -- translates into a risk-premium? The central 
aim of this section is to produce realistic estimates of the level of the risk premium that is likely to affect 
LIF, in a context where this instrument of private finance would apply to large populations of students. 
Our estimation strategy is based on a standard model of mortgage-type loans in which we incorporate 




We  shall  assume  that  human  capital  investment  (INV)  takes  place  at  the  age  of  18  and  lasts  a 
predetermined period D. Graduate/individuals start repaying at the age of 22 if they choose short higher 
education programs
9 (grace period of 3 years) or at the age of 24 if they opt for long programs
10 (grace 
period of 5 years).  
 
Modelling LIF basically consists in finding the value of the annual instalment Ω such that: 
 
INV. (1+r)
G = Ω. Σexp [µexp /(1+r)




 - r the discount rate reflecting the cost of capital and the general preference for the present (long 
term rates on treasury bonds for example);  
- exp>0  the potential professional experience, defined as exp=age–t; with t the age of study 
completion (t=21 for short higher education programs t=23 for long higher education programs); 
- exp ranging from 1 to D-G; where D is the duration of the LIF, G is the grace period (ie,direclty 
reflecting the length of studies) ; 
- µexp = Prob(w,exp,k=g> wexp,k=ng ) being the probability of payment estimated for a graduate (k=g) 
with a certain labour market experience; 
                                                 
9 Non university, ISCED 5 programs. 
10 Typically university, ISCED 6-7 programs. 12 
- wexp,k=ng being the annual net earnings threshold under which no payment is required. 
 
In  the  simple  model  exposed  above,  the  key  parameter  is  the  probability  of  payment  at  a  given 
age/experience
11 µexp It captures the whole idea of income-contingency (or income-forgiveness). Note in 
particular the assumption we make that higher education graduates(k=g) should pay only if their annual 
net wage is above the average wage of observed among non-graduates (k=ng) with similar potential 
labour market experience (wexp,k=ng).  
 
As one of the objectives of this paper is to quantify the cost of income contingency, we also need to 
estimate the value of the risk-free installment Ωrf; in other words, the payment that an investor would ask 
if she could be sure that all graduates would pay at every moment of the loan contract. Algebraically, this 
case corresponds to : 
 
INV.(1+r)
G = Ωrf . Σexp [1 /(1+r)
exp+G)]  [2] 
 
where µexp is now set to 1 in order to reflect the idea that the risk of defaut is nil. 
 
We finally define the notion of risk premium (RP) as the % increase in instalment caused by income-
contingency: 
 
RP= Ω / Ωrf  [3] 
 
or, equivalently, in absolute terms: 
 
rp = Ω – Ωrf  [4] 
                                                 
11 Age and potential experience are related as exp=a – t. 13 
 
3.2. Estimating the probability of payment function 
 
In the simple model exposed above, the key parameter is the probability of  payment µexp. We could 
immediately move to the simulation exercise using somehow arbitrary values. But the result would be 
trivial and bring little substance to the paper. So we opted for the more appealing approach that consists of 
estimating the value of this probability function using real information on relative wages and employment 
rates of higher education graduates.  
 
Our data come from a survey carried out in Belgium in 2000: the Panel Study on Belgian Households 
(PSBH). This is a small national survey undertaken by a consortium of universities. For a sample of about 
4,722  individuals  drawn  randomly  for  the  whole  Belgian  Population  it  provides  data  on  annual  net 
earnings, participation to labour market, working hours and personal characteristics such as age, gender 
and  –  most  importantly  --  education  attainment..  This  data  set  is  useful  to  evaluate  the  relationship 
between higher education (short or long
12 programs) and earnings at different stage of individuals' career, 
relative to less educated people. In the context of loans with income-forgiveness (LIF), these data can be 
use  to  estimate  the  probability  function  capturing  the  risk  that  annual  earnings  fall  below  a  certain 
threshold and, consequently, exonerate individuals from paying their annual instalment. In more technical 
terms,  simple  econometrics  applied  to  PSBH  help  us  quantifiy  the  probability  of  payment  (µexp)  in 
equation 1.  
 
Note that the notion of earnings hereafter includes part-time workers as well as people with no salaries. 
Strictly speaking thus, it combines wage and employment premia. Our basic wage data will also consist of 
net wages. This choice reflects the supposedly realistic assumption that extra private contribution to higher 
education funding comes in addition to current levels of taxation. 
 
                                                 
12 Typically organised within universities 14 
We define the loan payment/non-payment dummy (ie, the dependant variable of our probability model) by 
comparing the realized individual level of net earnings with the threshold level (Zexp). The latter is defined 
as the expected net annual earnings of individuals without higher education, as predicted by a 2
nd order 
polynomial experience/earnings profile, estimated using simple OLS regression: 
 
Zexp = E(wexp, k=ng)  [5] 
where: 
- wexp, k=ng = α + β.exp + γ.exp
2 + ε 
- exp=age-18 assuming non gradutes complete their studies at the age of 18; 
 
Each time annual net earning (wexp, k=g) is below the no-payment threshold (Zexp) we conclude to default 
(Pay=0), and normal payment of instalment Ω otherwise (Pay=1).  
 
The specification used for the probability function is logistic; specification being a 3rd order polynomial 
function in potential experience (exp):  
 
Prob(Pay=1) ≡ µexp =exp(ρ+ ς.exp +  σ.exp
2 )/[1+exp(ρ + ς.exp+  σ.exp
2]  [6] 
 
Predicted values of probability of payment (ie, 1 – risk of default) are plotted on graph 1 for both short
13 
and  long
14  program  graduates.  The  highest  probability  of  payment  is  observed  among  long  program 
graduates. The graph clearly suggests that the income-contingency is likely to be more important as an 
insurance mechanism for students who attend short programs. The same graph also indicates that the risk 
of default is clearly diminishing (probability of paying rising) during the 5 first years of presence on the 
labour market Finally, it is worth observing the almost complete reduction of the initial gap between the 
different categories in terms of risk of default at the end of people’s carreers. 
                                                 
13 Non-university programs 
14 Mainly university programs 15 
 




3.3. The cost of income-contingency 
 
The last step of the exercise involves simulating the value of the annual instalments with (Ω) or without 
(Ωrf) risk of default as estimated econometrically here above. Graph2 reports the estimated value of  the 
risk premium (equation [3]) as a function of the post-graduation duration of the loan (D-G).  
 
Graph 2 reports risk premia for graduates of both short and long higher education programs. Computations 
are based on the following technical assumptions. Discount rate is 4 percent (r=0.04). Investment is made 16 
at age 18 and payment starts at age 22 or 24 (3 & 5 years of grace) for a period of 20 years. The amount of 
money invested (INV) is 1,000 €.  
 
Quite logically, given the configuration of the probability of default reported in Graph 1, the risk premium 
is higher for people who graduate from short programs, particularly if duration of loan is less that 10 
years. This result pleads for income-contingent loans with relatively long repayment horizon. Considering 
the case of loan of 20 years of duration (beyond graduation), results suggest a risk premium ranging from 
13% for university (ISCED 6-7) graduates to 26% for non-university (ISCED 5) ones (see appendix 1 for 
detailed results).  
 
Graph 2. Risk premium according to type of higher education and loan duration (1000 € student loan, 
study length=3 years or 5 years, 4% discount rate. Risk-free instalment=1). 
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4. Risk shifting, risk pooling and adverse selection 
Section  3 gives  us  some idea of  the  plausible  cost  of  offering  income-contingency  to  a  large  set  of 
graduates. And our results suggest that this cost is substantial. But who should pay for it?  
To provide students with income-contingency -- and avoid among other problems high non-take up rates 
by risk-averse students -- two general approaches could be considered: risk pooling among students or risk 
shifting to society. As stated in section 2, it is important, especially for students from disadvantaged 
background to have some insurance in case of lost of earnings. The case for income contingency is also 
supported by basic human capital theory as well as justice principle (ability to pay). Risk pooling is an 
insurance system where risks of default are shared among graduates. Annual instalments contain a risk 
premium to cover the average cost of default of a given population of students, the premium reflecting the 
group risk rather than the individual risk.  
Under risk shifting, the default risk is borne by the taxpayer. Students would then benefit from income-
contingency, face housing-type interest rates or annual payment and private final lenders would enjoy a 
source of risk-free investment. But a total transfer of risk from lenders to the state induces a substantial 
fiscal cost and would lead public sector watchdogs to consider student loans as public debt since the 
taxpayers are supporting the full risk associated to the loan scheme.  
Given the classification problem -- and given the context of scarcity of public resources -- risk pooling 
might be the most relevant option to analyse. At the difference of an equity contract or graduate tax, the 
repayment remains proportional to the earnings premium associated to the completion of higher education 
degree. But it still implies, within a cohort of borrowers, redistribution from the students succeeding in the 
repayment of their loan and those failing to ensure the reimbursement.  
This principle of risk pooling was used for the Tuition Postponement Option at Yale University in the 
early 1970’s and was not very successful. The main disadvantage is to put the borrowers at some risk, 
depending on the probable future earnings capacity of the borrowing class, and more particularly on how 18 
many potential high earners choose to exit the income contingent repayment scheme for fear of getting 
into a cohort with too many potential low earners. This is an illustration of the typical adverse selection 
problem.  
To mitigate this effect, the  coverage  of the student  loans  scheme  should be as  large  as  possible,  ie, 
applicable to the full cohort of students enrolled in the higher education system. But even, in this more 
favourable context, to which extent should we fear this adverse selection problem? We believe that the 
structure of the data used in section 3 allows us to explore the consequences of risk-pooling and identify 
variables that are likely to mitigate its severity.  
Estimates in section 3 immediately reveal that risk-pooling among graduates of long higher education 
programs
1 (Graph 2) is less expensive than among graduates of shorter programs. Intuitively, we suppose 
that the former would a priori reject risk-pooling or mutualisation with the latter. Our first point is that 
this doze of additional pooling comes at a cost. that can be easily estimated given our data.  
Assuming a proportion α of high risk 1,000 € unit loans in the global portfolio, pooled risk premium (in 
absolute terms) is equal to: 
rp
*= α. rpgshort- (1-α).rpglong   [7] 
with 
- rpgshort= Ωgshort – Ωrfgshort
 , rpglong= Ωglong – Ωrfglong, using equation 4 
- 0 < α < 1, α being the proportion of high-risk students in the cohort of graduates; 
- and in particular rp
*>rpglong 
Estimates of pooled risk premium are reported in table 1. They show that pooling comes at a cost for low-
risk graduates (long programs) equal to 35.7% of the non-pooled risk premium. Such an increment could 
cause adverse selection.  19 
Table  1  –  Risk  pooling,  cost  premium  for  long  program  graduates*  and  lower  investment  on  short 
program graduates as way to reduce it (1,000 € unit loans, study length=3 years or 5 years, 4% discount 
rate, loan duration beyond graduation = 20 years, proportion α of high risk unit loans=0.5). 
Category of 
graduates 






Level of annual 
risk premium in € 
(rp) 
Cost of pooling (in %) 
for low-risk graduates 
(rp*/rpglong) 
All  graduates 




[b]  123.14  108.92  14.22  19.31/14.22=1.357 
High-risk 
graduates 
(k=g short)  
[c]  117.03  93.10  23.93  - 
Size of high risk student loan eliminating the cost of pooling of low-risk graduates: 
λ= rpglong/rpgshort=
 0.5943 
*Mainly university graduates 
 
Our second point however is that investing less money on riskier students should reduce its intensity. 
Indeed riskier students can (and even should, given the ability to pay principle) be asked to pay lower 
cumulated fees, and consequently borrow less money to finance their study program. Algebraically this 
means  imposing  that  investment/payment  by  short  program  graduates  (k=gshort)  represents  only  a 
fraction λ of that of long program graduates (k=glong). And to avoid adverse selection, this fraction λ 
should be such that pooled risk premium is equal to the one faced by long program graduates in a non-
pooling context (rpglong). Note also that λ can be applied directly to the risk premium as the latter is strictly 
proportional to the level of investment (see equations 4, 2 & 1) 
rp
* ≡ α. λ. rpgshort + (1-α). rpglong =rpglong   [8] 
with 0< λ < 1 ,  
or equivalently, assuming α= 0.5 20 
λ= rpglong/rpgshort   [9] 
Results in table 1 suggest that the typical loan size of a high-risk student (ie, attending a short program) 
should  be  equal  to  59.43%  of  that  of  a  low-risk  student.  This  reduction  factor  might  appear  rather 
important. In practice is very close to what we would expect in the Belgium system with uniform annual 
fees across higher education institutions but varying lengths of programs. Considering that riskier students 
study only 3 years while it takes 5 years for the others to graduate, we should end up with a loan size ratio 
of 3/5 (ie, 60%). In other words, pooling short and long programs, with uniform annual fees, would 





In order to secure additional funding resources for higher education systems, students loans are highly 
desirable.  But  the  case  in  favour  of  student  loans  largely  rests  on  the  ability  of  decision-makers  to 
implement  income  contingency.  Indeed,  income-contingent  repayments  are  critical  to  both  efficiency 
(borrowers and lenders should not be deterred due to excessive risk) and equity (contributions should be 
tailored to ex post ability to pay).  
 
But income-contingency comes at a cost. Considering the case of a 20 years student loan, our simulations 
show that risk premia directly reflecting the income contingency clause range from 13% for university 
graduates to 26% for non-university ones.  
 
Our analysis also suggests that returns to higher education in Belgium, particularly short programs, is not 
immediate. The first years of professional life are not systematically synonymous with larger net wages or 
higher employment rates. Keeping the cost of income-contingency at a reasonably level requires long 
repayment horizons (more than 10 years).  21 
 
But who should pay for income contingency? Options available are essentially twofold. First, risk shifting. 
In that case the default risk is borne by the taxpayer. Students would then face real estate-type annual 
payment and capital markets would enjoy a source of risk-free investment. But a total transfer of risk from 
lenders to the public sector induces a substantial fiscal cost. It would also lead public sector watchdogs to 
consider student loans as public debt, adding to the strain public finances currently face. 
 
This leaves us with the risk pooling option where annual instalments contain a risk premium to cover the 
average cost of default among the cohort (13% to 26% of the risk-free instalment as our estimates suggest 
in the case of Belgian graduates); the premium reflecting the group risk rather than the individual risk.  
 
The main advantage of risk pooling is that it is redistributive. Its disadvantage is its exposure to adverse 
selection, as many potential high earners might push for exiting the income contingent repayment scheme 
for fear of getting into a cohort with too many potential low earners. To mitigate this effect, the coverage 
of the student loans scheme should be as large as possible, ie, applicable to the full cohort of students 
enrolled in the higher education system. De facto this would confer the loan scheme a status almost 
equivalent to that of a state institution. It would also make transfers between categories of graduates less 
traceable or visible.  
 
But even in this more favourable context, adverse section might compromise the long run sustainability of 
an income-contingent loan scheme. Simple computations suggest that the cost for low-risk (university) 
Belgian graduates to be pooled with high-risk (non-university) graduates lead to a risk premium inflated 
by  35%. However  we  show  that  investing  less  money  on  riskier students  eliminates  this  cost.    The 22 
tentative conclusion is that riskier students
15 can and even should, given the ability to pay principle, be 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 : Annual and monthly instalments on income-contingent loans.  
 
1.1 - Short (3 years) higher education programs: 1,000 € unit loans, 4% discount rate, grace period 































4  607.79  348.58  50.65  29.05  1.74  259.21 
5  462.76  284.22  38.56  23.69  1.63  178.53 
6  372.72  241.37  31.06  20.11  1.54  131.34 
7  312.30  210.81  26.02  17.57  1.48  101.48 
8  269.38  187.94  22.45  15.66  1.43  81.45 
9  237.55  170.18  19.80  14.18  1.40  67.37 
10  213.13  156.00  17.76  13.00  1.37  57.13 
11  193.88  144.43  16.16  12.04  1.34  49.44 
12  178.37  134.82  14.86  11.24  1.32  43.54 
13  165.64  126.71  13.80  10.56  1.31  38.93 
14  155.05  119.79  12.92  9.98  1.29  35.26 
15  146.12  113.80  12.18  9.48  1.28  32.31 
16  138.51  108.59  11.54  9.05  1.28  29.92 
17  131.97  104.01  11.00  8.67  1.27  27.96 
18  126.31  99.95  10.53  8.33  1.26  26.35 
19  121.37  96.34  10.11  8.03  1.26  25.03 
20  117.03  93.10  9.75  7.76  1.26  23.93 25 
 
1.2 – Long (5 years) higher education programs: 1000 € unit loans. 4% discount rate, grace period 































4  543.05  407.79  45.25  33.98  1.33  135.26 
5  426.43  332.50  35.54  27.71  1.28  93.92 
6  352.08  282.37  29.34  23.53  1.25  69.70 
7  300.94  246.62  25.08  20.55  1.22  54.32 
8  263.80  219.86  21.98  18.32  1.20  43.94 
9  235.71  199.08  19.64  16.59  1.18  36.63 
10  213.78  182.50  17.81  15.21  1.17  31.28 
11  196.22  168.97  16.35  14.08  1.16  27.26 
12  181.89  157.72  15.16  13.14  1.15  24.17 
13  169.99  148.24  14.17  12.35  1.15  21.76 
14  159.98  140.13  13.33  11.68  1.14  19.85 
15  151.47  133.13  12.62  11.09  1.14  18.33 
16  144.15  127.03  12.01  10.59  1.13  17.12 
17  137.81  121.67  11.48  10.14  1.13  16.14 
18  132.29  116.93  11.02  9.74  1.13  15.36 
19  127.43  112.70  10.62  9.39  1.13  14.73 
20  123.14  108.92  10.26  9.08  1.13  14.22 
 